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Robert Levine
RETREAT INTO MYTH: JosEPH GoEBBELS, KoLBERG, AND THE IDEAL
IN NAZI CINEMA
BY RoBERT LEVINE
"All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing:
war."- Walter Benjamin
"Even entertainment is nowadays politically important, if not
decisive for the outcome of the war."- Joseph Goebbels
"Cinema is a ribbon of dreams."- Orson Welles

Nazi cinema enjoys a dual position in the
history of German film. It stands as the dark
hallmark of an abhorrent and reprehensible
regime while at the same time representing a
time of great success and productivity for the
nation's industry, spawning films that still fascinate and engage cineastes today, both for
their inherent quality and craft as well as their
role as propaganda pieces designed to further
indoctrinate their audiences with National
Socialist ideology. Both Adolf Hitler and Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels were
avid film enthusiasts prior to and throughout
their ascension to power; they were also great
opportunists, and in assuming control over the
German film industry, they took the reins of
what was arguably the most productive and
influential in Europe.
In many ways, the Nazi leadership and
the German cinema made for an easy courtship. The German national cinema, ironically
enough, grew out of an overtly nationalist
thrust-an urgent desire to see German habits
and German traditions compete with other
foreign cultures for representation on screen
(Taylor 126). Upon takeover, the Nazis "inherited a cinema with a strong and distinctive
national tradition at a time when film was already accepted as a respectable and effective
medium for the transmission of ideas" (Taylor 142). Hitler and Goebbels would shed this
distinctive tradition (characterized by the stark
amorality and expressionistic aesthetic of films
like Fritz Lang's M) almost immediately upon
takeover, however, opting to take the nation-
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alism to a much higher level-into the realm of
fantasy. Hitler's tenants of Aryan superiority,
racial purity and the "inevitable" rise of the
Nazi empire congealed into a grandiose false
ideal, a work of megalomaniacal imagination,
and the cinema would prove the ideal medium
for pushing it through: "As a regime committed to an irrational ideology, the Third Reich
was drawn naturally to a medium whose appeal lay in its ability to alter reality to create
the proper emotional effect" (Weinberg 105).
Hitler and Goebbels recognized, more perhaps
than anyone else in history did, the power of
the cinema as a formative political tool, and
they set it into action right away.
Debate persists among scholarly studies
of Nazi cinema regarding how many of the
films produced during the period of Nazi rule
(1933-1945) actually constitute "propaganda,"
due partially to the definitional difficulties the
term itself presents. In his book Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, Richard Taylor makes an admirable attempt to sort
through the various trappings of the word,
coming to a succinct conclusion: "Propaganda
is the attempt to influence the public opinions
of an audience through the transmission of
ideas and values" (15). For the purposes of this
essay, this definition will suffice. The other
variable that grays the propaganda label attached to the Nazi cinema is that many of the
films produced under the regime were consciously created as entertainment, rather than
instructional or intimidation pieces. What one
might conceive as a period brimming with
sledgehammer-subtle cinematic assaults of
Orwellian brainwashing upon even a cursory
examination reveals an industry output primarily composed of slick entertainment fare
on par with what is normally associated with
Hollywood. According to author Eric
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Rentschler, "so-called 'unpolitical' features
constituted 86% of the epoch's films" (Illusion
37). Citing film sociologist Gerd Albrecht's
Nationalsozialistische Politik, Rentschler writes
that generic" or entertainment productions
constituted 941 of the 1,094 feature films made
under Nazi control, including 295 melodramas
and biopics, 123 detective and adventure films,
and 523 comedies and musicals (Rentschler Afterlife 7). This was a cinema dominated by "formula fare and escapist diversion replete with
well-known stars, upbeat scores and alluring
production values" (Rentschler Afterlife 9). In
other words, it was no two-minute hate, and
this inclination to entertain was reflected in
many of Nazi Germany's larger social policies.
National Socialism was "a political order that
openly proffered tourism, consumerism and
recreation as dialectical complements to law,
order and restriction" (Rentschler Afterlife xi).
To those people not alienated, despised and
deported by the fascist ideologies of the party,
Nazi Germany aimed to please (albeit with
candy-bar concessions and pleasures as manufactured and orchestrated as anything else).
A government repute for its public rallies and
splendiferous parades, "show business and
National Socialism were of a piece"
(Rentschler fllusion 35).
Nazi Germany is history's most infamous
cult of personality, and Hitler is the dictator
star-supreme, but if any one person were assigned the role of Oz, the man behind the curtain, it would be Goebbels, Reich Minister for
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
Goebbels was appointed in March of 1933. A
brilliant orator and consummate mythmaker,
his role in the party to that point had been part
salesmen, part ringmaster. Goebbels was responsible for making his Fuhrer not simply
palatable to the public, but irresistible, and he
orchestrated large parades and musical reviews to that end (Baird 16). Upon his appointment to Minister, he assumed control over all
the media and communications apparatuses
of German society in the form of the
Reichskulturkammer, or State Chambers of Culture, with branches for each of the main media enterprises (Art, Music, Theatre, AuthorII
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ship, Press, Radio and Film) (Manvell and
Fraenkel 69). With the film industry in particular, he pledged reform, and the provisional
Reich Film Chamber [Reichsfilmkammer] was
established by July 1933 (Manvell and
Fraenkel69). All professionals in the industry
were required to join (non-Aryans being excluded, having been promptly expelled) (Taylor 145). A single official film industry trade
union (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) was established,
for which membership was also compulsory
(Manvell and Fraenkel 70). The Reich Film
Law of February 1934 ensured that all scripts
were examined and revised prior to production (Manvell and Fraenkel 71). A rigid system of film censorship, in keeping with the
party line, came into being, with Goebbels at
the very top of the heap. It was designed so
that his directives" could pass down the chain
of command to those actually engaged
in ... drama and film production" (Manvell and
Fraenkel 69). Citing Albrecht, Weinberg
writes, "Goebbels was involved intensively in
the conceptualization and production of propaganda films in general and of weekly newsreels in particular" (107). Film was undoubtedly his passion. His personal diaries are "replete with references to movie stars, appearances at premieres, and criticisms of specific
films and actors" (Weinberg 107). A perusal
of his wartime diaries from 1939-41 shows that
he reserved time almost every evening to
watch films, revise scripts, etc. He even enjoyed American pictures. Of Frank Capra's Mr.
Deeds Goes to Town, he wrote: "Marvelous stuff
from America, with Gary Cooper. Wonderfully made, excellent ideas, beautifully acted.
I am delighted" (Diaries 13). Of course, with
Hollywood's non-Aryan power base, his appreciation could only go so far: "In the
evening, Leni Riefenstahl reports to me on her
trip to America. She gives me an exhaustive
description, and one that is far from encouraging. We shall get nowhere there. The Jews
rule by terror and bribery" (Diaries 9).
From his success as a rally speaker and
parade organizer, Goebbels understood the
advantages of addressing a crowd, for "it is
crowds rather than isolated individuals that
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may be induced to run the risk of death to secure the triumph of a creed or an idea" (Baird
17). It is no wonder he gravitated towards the
cinema, for as Taylo! articulates:
Cinema appeals to the individual as a
member of a crowd. In this context it
contains elements of theatre: the member of a cinema audience, like a spectator in a theatre, is uniquely susceptible
not only to his or her own emotions, but
to those of the mass around, and to the
interaction between the emotions of that
individual and those of the mass .. .he/
she is like putty in the propagandist's
hands (16).
Goebbels recognized the formative power of
the cinema, its remarkable ability to influence
and suggest. He set out to create a film industry in full service of the Reich, where every
exposed frame constituted a brick in an everclimbing ideological wall, whose purpose was
to contain the German masses and the world
at-large in a psychic enclosure with the Nazi/
Aryan ideal, further separating all three from
the polluted nature of the regime and the sinister reality it imposed.
It was Goebbels who kept Nazi cinema
firmly steeped in its entertainment foundations. In this, he disagreed with Hitler on two
fundamental points regarding propaganda.
First, Hitler felt that art and politics should be
kept distinct and separate. In his book Mein
Kampf, he writes, "where the destiny and existence of a people are at stake, all obligation
toward beauty ceases" (19). In conversation,
he remarked:
Certainly, on the one hand I want to use
the film fully and completely as a medium of propaganda, but in such a way
that every viewer knows that today he's
going to a political film .. .It makes me
sick when people make politics under
the guise of art. Either art or politics...
(qtd. in Taylor 148).
Second, Hitler felt that the importance of
strong propaganda is inversely proportional
to party membership. It is crucial only insofar
as it is necessary to draw allegiance. Once allegiance is solidified, Hitler felt that the sig-
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nificance of propaganda decreased. Goebbels,
however, felt that propaganda efforts should
be continued even after power has been consolidated (Taylor 143). Add~tionally, aesthetics were absolutely a concern and, above all,
Goebbels never wanted an audience member
to "know that today he's going to a political
film." Disallowing that realization was to
Goebbels the key to effective propaganda, and
the primary impetus behind his emphasis on
entertainment. He feared that overtly political propaganda, where the hand of the government was clearly visible, risked alienating
the audience. An audience aware that it is the
target of didacticism will naturally be skeptical, and Goebbels hoped to avoid such a dynamic. As Goebbels stated in a letter to Soviet
filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, presumably in an
attempt to solicit his participation: "I do not
require a film to begin and end with a National
Socialist procession. Leave these to us - we
know how to do them better than you do" (qtd.
in Taylor 211). Goebbels relegated more overt
forms of propaganda to the newsreels that preceded each film showing. He disdained overly
intellectual or experimental projects, keeping
his eye firmly fixed on the lowest common denominator and the bottomline. In 1937, when
American imports were sti~l out-finessing domestic German productions, he kept his ear
to the ground; audiences made it clear they
desired their Steamboat Willie before their
Battleship Potemkin. His features were to maintain "the appearance of escapist vehicles and
innocent recreations" (Rentschler Afterlife 16).
Images of boot-stomping and sieg-heils were
also threatening to international audiences, for
Goebbels was a shrewd businessman- he expected the German film industry to be the most
successful in the world. His immediate nationalization of the film industry upon takeover
in 1933 ensured that all profits from the films
fed back into government hands. Rentschler
encapsulates Goebbels' objectives best:
[H]e wanted films with formal assurance and popular appeal, fantasy productions that would expand German
market shares and alleviate the need for
foreign imports. He sought to create a
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star system; he cultivated scriptwriters
and directors. Like any Hollywood entrepreneur, he checked box-office returns and stressed the crucial role of
advertising ... Goebbels articulated a desire to create a cinema that could both
satisfy the domestic market and function as a foreign emissary (Afterlife 19).
Goebbels became, in a way, a perverse Cecil
B. DeMille: part entertainer, part businessman,
all emotional engineer. Writes Manvell: "The
effect of [Goebbel' s] controls was to lower the
temperature of German film-making until it
approached zero ... German films became escapist and politically harmless, or nondescript;
and notable for the absence, rather than the
presence, of a swastika" (Manvell and
Fraenkel72). Indeed, many of these films were
designed as period pieces to assume an empty
"universalism" and avoid comparison with
contemporary political realities. However,
Manvell' s statement is slightly misleading in
that it equates surface elements and content
("absence, rather than the presence, of a swastika") with an inherent political innocuousness. Posed with the aforementioned question- can these ostensibly "harmless," apolitical films be considered propaganda? - the
answer lies resolutely in the affirmative. They
were made with the express purpose of ushering through the antiseptic facade of the
"true" Aryan existence as fabricated by the
Nazi party, an existence that could only really subsist on screen- in the realm of the ideal
and the fantastic.
If Nazi film production kept a steady
pace prior to 1940, the onset of war kicked it
into high gear. The industry itself was never
more successful- escapist fare made film
houses a welcome refuge from the trials of
wartime living. It was not until 1942, when
the Sixth army of the German forces lost over
three-quarters of its numbers to death or capture at the battle of Stalingrad, did a
discernable shift in Goebbels' approach to conceiving the propaganda feature take place.
With the production of Munchhausen (1943)
Goebbels made a direct attempt to prompt a
psychological and spiritual rebound on the
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part of the German populace in response to a
specific political/military setback (Rentschler
Afterlife 193). His strategy was characteristically diverting, and the product more
fantastical than ever. Stalingrad and
Munchhausen concurrently mark "the watershed in delineating Goebbel' s shift from a combination of factual-mythical propagandawhich characterized his approach during the
early years of the war- to an increasing dependence on irrational themes" (Baird 40). So
would begin Goebbels' "total war of illusion
meant to distract Germans from painful and
traumatic realities, from the presentiment of a
national catastrophe and the shame of mass
murder" (Rentschler Afterlife 212). Days after
a massive Allied bombing, Munchhausen premiered in Berlin as part of Ufa' s 25 1h anniversary celebration (Rentschler Afterlife 194). Conceived as the "ultimate entertainment," the
film is a ribald pop fantasy based on a popular piece of European folklore. The eponymous
hero is a grand liar whose on-screen antics bear
an interesting parallel to the Minister of Propaganda himself: "This is to be the story about
a hero who fabricates tales, and, mimicking the
powers of cinema, incarnates a medium that
traffics in illusions" (Rentschler Afterlife 198).
No expense was spared in the creation of
Munchhausen; Goebbels intended to produce
a grandstanding showpiece that would demonstrate the dominance of the German
cinema's ability to entertain. The film's highconcept production "put German technical
genius on parade and offered a compellingand what was hoped to be reassuring-triumph
of special effects" (Rentschler Afterlife 196). The
film would also serve to anesthetize the German populace to a stinging defeat on the battlefield and the ominous threat of Allied victory
that was now raining down over their heads,
providing the ultimate vehicle of escape in the
character of the Baron, whose magical powers
allow him to travel through space and time
and escape trepidation with ease. According
to Rentschler, Munchhausen represents the
era's "ultimate exercise in wishful thinking"
(Afterlife 202). That is, until Kolberg.
The loss at Stalingrad also propelled
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Goebbels to green-light Kolberg, a historical
epic about a courageous civilian army defending its town against Napolean' s forces, though
the film would not see release until 1945.
Kolberg, as Tayior put it, became "the swan
song of Nazi cinema" for which Munchhausen
is an interesting antecedent (196). Both stern
from the same hyper-ambitious, reactionary
thrust on Goebbels' part: "With German reversal in the Russian campaign in 1942 and
growing disillusionment on the hornefront, the
Minister of Propaganda turned his attention
to what he believed would be the greatest
movie ever produced" (Weinberg 113). Perhaps at the behest of an unfair precedent set
by the popular success of Munchausen,
Goebbels spearheaded a project that would
come to represent Nazi cinema's last gasp, a
desperate conflagration of resources in lastditch service of an increasingly delusional ideology.
Kolberg, like Munchhausen, was an enormous undertaking. Like the filmmakers behind Munchhausen, director Viet Harlan Uud
Suss) received carte blanche from Goebbels to
complete the film according to his specifications. Kolberg's budget would eventually exceed that of Munchhausen, totaling upwards
of 8.5 millions Reichmarks, almost eight times
the cost of an average film produced within
the industry at the time (Taylor 196). Staging
its elaborate parade and battle scenes would
require the involvement of over 187, 000
people, including several real army units
(Weinberg 113). Nearly two years of shooting
amassed over 90 hours of raw footage
(Weinberg 113). Kolberg became a sinkhole of
time and resources and a puzzling priority for
the Minister of Propaganda. He removed more
and more troops from the field to act as extras
in the film. Even with a scarcity of real amrnunition on the WWII battlefields, Goebbels had
munitions factories work double time to produce blanks for the film (Weinberg 113). Despite the need for preservatives and food supplies all across the empire, tons of salt were
shipped in to give the illusion of snow (Taylor 197). Even Harlan, the director, expressed
confusion as to his Minister's intentions:
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During the shooting I constantly discussed with the officers the sacrifice that
the film involved for the military. Most
of them were gla~i, and none was keen
to get back to the front as soon as pessible. But nobody understood why a
film should be so important" (qtd. in
Taylor 197).
It is ironic that a film portraying a defeatist
and ineffectual military would provide refuge
for real German soldiers whose will to fight
was quickly waning. Harlan continues:
It was the year 1944. Stalingrad had long
fallen and the danger of a war that had
been completely lost moved ever more
uncomfortably close to us ... Hitler as
well as Goebbels must have been convinced that the distribution of a film like
this would be more useful than a rnilitary victory. They must have been hoping for a miracle. And what better to perform a miracle than this' dream factory'
that is the cinema (qtd. in Taylor 197).
What Goebbels hoped to achieve was a mass
grassroots galvanization, an awakening of
nationalist spirit in the German populace similar to the my-country-before-myself credo
taken up by the Kolberg citizenry in the film.
Again, as with Munchhausen, he felt a welltimed cinematic spectacle of the highest quality could prompt a psychological resuscitation
in his audience, and he pursued it as a political necessity. Kolberg stands at the nexus of
Goebbels' two primary directives: on one end,
the aim to influence, dictate; on the other, the
aim to entertain and enthrall. Investing as
much as he did in the completion of Kolberg, it
is difficult to tell which one of these aims he
considered the priority; or, if he saw any difference between these two motives at all.
More than most Goebbels-sanctioned
features, Kolberg wears its propagandic intent
on its sleeve. It is, like many films in the Nazi
oeuvre, a period piece, though clearly intended as an allegory, with themes of duty and
sacrifice intended as relevant to the conternporary German dilemma. A title opens the
film, reading "Breslau, 1813." Citizens of the
city march en masse down its streets, filling
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the screen. They walk arrn-in-arrn, singing in
unison. Inside his chambers, the King of
Prussia, Frederick William II, is braced by commander Gneisenau, Goebbels' cinematic
stand-in and mouthpiece. In the background,
a choir can be heard singing lines from a poem
by German patriot Theodor Komer, a poem
Goebbels quoted famously in his speech announcing total war in 1943 (Taylor 198).
Gneisenau demands a proclamation from the
king inviting the citizens to participate in the
war effort. The King scoffs at first, calling
Gneisenau an "impractical dreamer." "Reality is different," says the King. "I know reality," says Gneisenau, again establishing his
character affinity with Goebbels, the
rnythmaker and the propagator of "truth." "I
looked [reality] in the face many years ago"
says Gneisenau, "at Kolberg." We then dissolve to a title reading "Vienna, 1806." This
will be the film's central narrative, framed by
the story of Gneisenau and the King. After
hearing an announcement declaring the surrender of the various cities of the German
Empire to Napoleon, we switch to Kolberg,
where the people are celebrating in an annual
festival. Nettlebeck, the brewrnaster and
mayor of the village, is concerned over the
threat of French occupation. A paragon of nationalism and stubborn pride, Nettlebeck is
set off against the other "pragmatists" of the
town leadership, who intend to surrender to
Napoleon should his forces reach Kolberg. The
military presence in the town is inept and lazy;
they've allowed their cannons to rust. Together with a wounded lieutenant seeking refuge from battle, Nettlebeck sets out to prepare
the citizenry of Kolberg for retaliation. Meanwhile, the lieutenant, named Shill, strikes up
a romance with a local farm girl named Maria.
Nettlebeck's rebuking of a French emissary
draws Napolean's wrath. The emperor steers
his armies toward Kolberg. As Loncadou,
Kolberg's misled military commander, debates
with Nettlebeck over the necessity of fighting,
French troops occupy the farmhouse of
Maria's family, just outside of Kolberg. Maria's
brother Klaus, portrayed as an effeminate
rnilquetoast, toasts Napoleon with the French
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soldiers, disgracing his father. Nettlebeck is
imprisoned for his insolence. He sends Maria
on a mission to Konigsberg to demand of the
King that a ne'Y commander be sent to
Kolberg. At the behest of the citizenry,
Nettlebeck is freed, and the new commander
arrives; it is Gneisenau, now participating in
his own narrative and again providing voice
to Goebbels' dictums. Gneisenau scolds
Nettlebeck for his questioning of orders. "You
want to lead but can't obey?" he asks. Here
we see the fascist ideology begin to emerge;
in times of great distress and turmoil, concern
for one's homeland is pivotal, but never at the
expense of hierarchy and order. "Otherwise,"
the commander states "we'd be on the road to
anarchy." In the following scene, with a speech
supposedly scripted by Goebbels himself,
Gneisenau addresses the people of Kolberg
directly (Manvell and Fraenkel85). He begins
with "Citizens of Kolberg, Prussians, Germans!" effectively drawing the intended metaphoric line of the film. He states:
No love is more sacred than love for
one's fatherland. No joy is sweeter than
the joy of freedom . .. Citizens and soldiers, from farm labourer to citizen general, you want to be as good as your fathers were. Dare to live up to them: you
have their example, so set an example.
The best way to defend a fortress is to
attack (qtd. in Taylor 204).
As Taylor points out, "once more we have a
speech in the film that could just as well be
addressed to the Berliners of 1945 as to the
Kolbergers of 1807" (Taylor 204). The battle
ensues, and the Kolberg uprising proves to be
a resilient one. The people make continual sacrifices of person and property, but ultimately
prevail. They succeed in keeping the French
forces from breaching their gates. The story
then returns to 1813 in Breslau. Gneisenau has
completed his story, and his King is swayed.
As he sits down to sign the proclamation,
Gneisenau moves to the window looking out
over the Prussian people. Inspired by the
memories of Kolberg, he begins to pontificate,
and his words summarize the ultimate desires
of Goebbels. Speaking almost directly into the
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camera at Goebbels' Berliner audience,
Gneisenau says:
The people are filled with a mysterious
strength. The example the citizens of
Kolb.erg once gave them, they want to
follow and finally shake off their chains.
The people are rising for coming battle.
The storm is breaking loose ... from the
ashes and rubble, like a phoenix, a new
people will rise. A new nation.
The message is clear: Kolberg is an example.
Emulate it and find the honor they found.
Kolberg was a deliberate attempt at
political self-preservation via aesthetic means.
As a propaganda piece, it is a virtual catalogue
of prototypical Nazi/ Aryan qualities. Several
other characteristics of the National Socialist
ideal are evinced in addition to the chestthumping nationalism embodied by
Nettlebeck and Gneisenau. Not entirely reievant to the central lesson of the narrative, they
often serve to reinforce the ideal via counterpoint. For example, Maria's brother Klaus,
whose behavior confirms the Nazi distaste
toward internationalism. Klaus announces
early in the film that he has "become a citizen
of the world" while abroad at music school.
Nettlebeck, the protector of the homeland, regrets his decision to send him there. Fey and
childish, Klaus is shown to contribute nothing to the military cause. He drinks with
French soldiers and cries at the sounds of cannon fire. Towards the end of the film, he foolishly tries to retrieve his violin from his
flooded house and is struck down by a cannon blast. An example of how self-interest
breeds weakness, Klaus also demonstrates that
"being abroad in Nazi cinema means potential attraction to the foreign, distance from the
homeland and all sources of well-being and
stability" (Rentschler Illusion 35). Internationalism is a corrupting influence. Indeed, after
watching his son toast Napoleon, Klaus' father states that his house is tainted. "I'll never
sit at that table again. This house died when
they stole my son." Later, he burns the house
down and kills himself in the fire. The many
undesirable attributes of the French as portrayed in the film help to buttress the effigy of
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the courageous Kolberg Aryans. The"life-anddeath" struggle of the Kolbergers is contrasted
with the "relative coldness" of the French (Taylor 205). The Fren~h appear "distant in their
manner, they sit around at tables in rather effete fashion, and they wear wigs" (Taylor 205).
In another shot, two French commanders c;onverse in the foreground while a black man is
visible between them in the background," emphasizing to German audiences that the enemy is racially inferior, and indeed racially
mixed as well" (Taylor 204). The French are
also used as negative examples of the authoritarian order prescribed by Gneisenau. The
French commander leading the assault on
Kolberg is told to order a cease-fire to accommodate peace talks in Tilsit. He rejects the
edict, declaring haughtily, "That does not apply to me." Later, he is reprimanded for" costing his Emperor an army!" Again, the fascist
ideal ("orders are orders") is reinforced by
counterexample. Aryan gender typing is also
evident in the multiple shots of women
screaming frantically while their homes are
bombarded, their domestic realm violated
(Nettlebeck, on the other hand, watches his
house burn and states simply, "Life goes on").
Kolberg ultimately proved to be too much,
too late. By the time of its release, the fall of
the German Empire seemed inevitable. Due
to Allied infiltration, the film could not even
be premiered in Berlin. Goebbels was forced
to parachute the film into the Atlantic Fortress
of Rochelle in occupied France (Taylor 206).
The encroaching specter of defeat seriously undermined the film's propagandic message.
Audience reception was lukewarm (Taylor
206). Goebbels, however, remained irrepressible. When Kolberg fell to the Russians in
March of 1945, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
We have now had to evacuate Kolberg.
The town, which has been defended
with such extraordinary heroism, could
no longer be held. I will ensure that the
evacuation of Kolberg is not mentioned
in the OKW report. In view of the severe psychological repercussions on the
Kolberg film we could do without that
for the moment (Entries 167).
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This comment speaks volumes, not only raising the question of which is the means and
which is the ends (the war or the film), but
indi~ating that Goebbels had now completely
severed his tenuous fidelity to reality. As Taylor articulates, propaganda "canalizes an already existing stream," but if that stream, that
reality, is entirely false, the illusion breaks
down (210). For this reason, Kolberg has come
to embody "the declining fortunes of the
Wehrmacht and the progressive retreat into
myth which characterized Nazi propaganda
during the last years of the Third Reich" (Baird
9). Goebbels seems foolish to have pursued the
project at the time that he did. Based on his
comments earlier, Harlan himself was aware
of the futility of the project, which might explain all the multiple references, both visual
and aural, to self-burial throughout Kolberg.
Nettlebeck is heard saying, "They can bum the
houses, but not the ground. If they do, we'll
become moles." Later, at Gneisenau's (i.e.
Goebbels') order, the villagers dig out flood
canals so that they can block the enemy's advance with water. The image of the villagers
digging relentlessly in unison not only suggests they're digging their own mass grave,
but also evokes the mass graves used to bury
the victims of the Holocaust.
Indeed, Goebbels' edicts as Minister towards the end of the war make the suggestion
that his thoughts were not entirely lucid. On
April 17, 1945, with Berlin about to be overrun, Goebbels called a fifty-man assembly. He
mentioned Kolberg, then announced plans for
another film, "The Twilight of the Gods of
Berlin," a film that would be shown a hundred years in the future (Roper xxxi). His staff
"looked at him with amazement and concluded that he had gone off his head" (Roper
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xxxi).

Kolberg, despite its heritage, has all the
makings of an extremely entertaining film,
with endearing characters and battle sequences that are still impressive by today' s
standards. To a viewer raised on the films of
Hollywood, Kolberg's pleasures are easily accessible, primarily because its conventions are
recognizable as our own, from the David vs.
Goliath theme to the romantic side-plot (the
only thing missing is comic relief). Indeed,
Goebbels often "let Hollywood be his guide"
and made"films crafted along classical American lines" (Rentschler Illusion 41). Additionally, "the utopian energies tapped by the feature films of the Third Reich in a crucial manner resembled, indeed at times consciously
emulated, American dreams" (Rentschler Afterlife xii). Within this affinity, there lies a disturbing realization: that our cinemas, and cultures by association, are equal part myth-machines, rival purveyors of a deceptive ideal and
that we, as viewers, are equally susceptible. It
is simple, with the benefit of hindsight, to point
out the propagandic elements that permeate
the films of the Nazi Cinema, but w ould we
have been so capable at the time of their release? Finally, we have the figure of Joseph
Goebbels, a man consumed by his own myths
and "enamored of [his] own media images"
(Rentschler Afterlife 222). He came to personify
Walter Benjamin's presage that, with the advent of the cinema, "[mankind's] self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can
experience its own destruction as an aesthetic
pleasure of the first order" (Benjamin 242).
With Kolberg, his roles as entertainer and engineer became undistinguishable, perhaps
even to him.
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